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 Is it possible to recover lost moral ground? In the closing episodes of  Breaking 
Bad it becomes clear that Walter White believes that the correct answer to this 
question is an affi rmative one. Walt believes that he can, and that he has, recov-
ered lost moral ground. 
 Breaking Bad may be said to explore two distinct and incompatible ways of 
attempting to recover lost moral ground. The fi rst way is  revisionist . This is to 
rewrite the script of what, morally speaking, has occurred, so that it appears 
that nothing wrong was done. Since no moral ground has been lost, there is 
no moral ground to recover. The second way is  restorative . This is to admit to 
morally wrongful behavior, but to attempt to make amends for it. While we 
concede that it is possible to recover lost moral ground in both of these ways, 
we deny that Walt is able to do so in both of these ways. At best, Walt can only 
hope to recover lost moral ground by attempting to make amends for his past 
misdeeds. 
 Before looking at these two kinds of attempts to recover lost moral ground 
in Walt’s case, however, two defenses against accusations of moral wrongdoing 
will fi rst be considered, since Walt also avails of these defenses. The fi rst is the 
 justifi catory defense, that of seeking to justify the moral wrongdoing, so that it 
is no longer morally wrong. The second is the  mitigatory defense, that of seek-
ing to excuse the moral wrongdoing, so that the person is no longer respon-
sible for the moral wrongdoing. As will be seen, it is not possible, ultimately, 
to defend Walt against accusations of moral wrongdoing in either of these two 
ways, beyond a few cases. 
 DEFENDING YOURSELF FROM BLAME 
 J.L.  Austin famously argued that when you are accused of acting in a way 
that is wrong, bad, or even just inept, there are two avenues of defense. You 
may accept full responsibility for the action, but deny that it was wrong, bad, 
or inept. This is the justifi cation defense. You accept that you performed the 
action, but you attempt to justify the action by attempting to demonstrate 
that it was, in fact, the right thing to do. The second route is to agree that the 
action was wrong, bad, or inept, but to deny that you were responsible—either 
fully or partially—for the action. This is the excuse defense. You attempt to 
excuse the action by attempting to reduce or eliminate your responsibility for 
the action. 1 
 In the criminal law, almost every crime may be said to have two elements: 
the fi rst is the forbidden behavior, known as the  actus reus (“guilty act”) which 
can involve failing to do something as well as doing something. The second 
element is the state of mind of the individual engaging in the behavior, which 
includes both the knowledge of what one is doing and the choice of doing it; 
these are known collectively as the  mens rea (“guilty mind”). The forbidden 
behavior must be voluntary in the basic sense that one is in control of one’s 
behavior; one is not, for example, hypnotized, sleepwalking, or drugged. 2 The 
required state of mind can vary in degree. It can be  intentional , as the crime 
of murder (killing “with malice aforethought”), such as when Todd Alquist 
shoots Andrea Cantillo on her front porch within view of Jesse Pinkman 
(“Granite State”). It can be merely  knowing , as in the crime of voluntary 
manslaughter—for example, killing someone when provoked, such as when 
Spooge’s wife tips the stolen ATM on his head because he is verbally abus-
ing her (“Peekaboo”). It can be merely  reckless , as in the crime of (so-called) 
“involuntary manslaughter,” such as running a red light and killing someone 
crossing the street as a result; something like this could have happened when 
Walt was running red lights while driving his car out to the Tohajiillee Indian 
Reservation to save his money from being torched by Jesse (“To’hajiilee”). Or 
it can be merely  negligent , as in the crime of criminally negligent manslaughter, 
as seems possible in the case of the negligent error made by fl ight traffi c con-
troller Donald Margolis—a result of his depressed state—that led to Wayfarer 
515 colliding mid-air with JM 21 over Albuquerque, killing 167 passengers 3 
(“ABQ”). In each case, however, it must be true that the person knew, or 
should have known, what was happening, and that the person chose, or failed 
to choose, to act. 
 Defenses by justifi cation and excuse accept that the person committed the 
“guilty act” and that the person had the requisite “guilty mind.” Nevertheless, 
they insist that the person is not to be found guilty of criminal or moral wrong-
doing. The justifi cation defense says that there is nothing wrong with the 
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“guilty act,” and that it should not be condemned. The excuse route says 
that even though there is something wrong with the “guilty act,” and even 
though the person had a “guilty mind,” nevertheless, the person should not 
be condemned. 
 JUSTIFYING OR EXCUSING YOUR ACTIONS 
 The justifi cation defense is more straightforward than the excuse defense. It 
can be understood in terms of a choice between two evils; that is, the “guilty 
act” may be performed because it is the lesser of two evils. The idea is that, in 
the particular situation, it would be a lesser evil to violate the moral rule, or 
break the law, than it would be to abide by the moral rule or to obey the law. 4 
For example, in Season Three’s “One Minute,” when Walt’s brother-in-law, 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Hank Schrader, is shot at by Marco 
and Leonel Salamanca while in his car, he reverses his car into Leonel, severely 
injuring him, and then shoots Marco as Marco is about to behead him with 
an axe. Hank’s injuring and killing the two assassins (cousins of drug king-
pin Tuco Salamanca, whom Hank had killed earlier in a shoot-out in Season 
Two’s “Grilled”) was justifi ed because it was in self-defense. There was noth-
ing morally wrong or criminal in what he did. The same can be said of Skyler 
White slicing Walt’s hand with a kitchen knife when she refuses to run from 
the police with Walt, believing that he may have killed their brother-in-law, 
Hank (“Ozymandias”). What she did was justifi ed because she was acting in 
self-defense as well as in defense of her children. There was nothing morally 
wrong or criminal in what she did. In both cases, Hank and Skyler know full 
well what they are doing, and choose to so act, but the behavior is permissible 
and not to be condemned, because it can be said to be a lesser evil to harm an 
aggressor than to suffer harm from an aggressor. 5 
 The excuse defense is more complicated than the justifi cation defense. For 
behavior to be excused, it must be the case that the person knows or should 
know what he or she is doing, chooses to act, and yet is not blamable or not  as 
blamable. That is, even though the person has a “guilty mind,” nevertheless, he 
or she is not as morally or legally blameworthy. These cases may be a matter of 
the person having a diminished capacity: examples include immaturity due to 
young age, mental illness, or the existence of duress or coercion. 6 For example, 
in Season Two’s “Mandala,” when 10-year-old Tomás Cantillo shoots and kills 
Christian “Combo” Ortega on orders from the two unnamed drug dealers 
working for Fring, he is not as morally or legally blameworthy for the kill-
ing, because he is merely a child. Or take Season Five’s “Granite State,” in 
which Jesse agrees to remain as a prisoner and cook methamphetamine for Jack 
Welker, after one of the White Supremacists, Todd, kills his former girlfriend, 
Andrea, and threatens to kill her only remaining son, Brock. In this situation, 
Jesse is not as morally or legally blameworthy for cooking for the gang because 
he is being coerced into doing so. 
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 Although insanity is also a moral and legal excuse, it should be noted that 
being a homicidal maniac is not a case of insanity. Nor is engaging in anti-social 
and/or criminal behavior the same as being mentally ill. To quote the Model 
Penal Code, “the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormal-
ity manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.” 7 For 
example, it would not be possible to excuse Tuco from being less blameworthy 
for his killings on the basis that he is a homicidal maniac, which he clearly is. 
 “HE’LL KILL YOUR ENTIRE FAMILY IF YOU LET HIM GO” 
 Given justifi cation or excuse as the two possible avenues of defense, it is dif-
fi cult to see how Walt could ever avail himself of the latter defense. He is not 
immature due to young age. He is not insane. He is not suffering from any 
mental illness. He was not coerced into entering a life of crime and becoming 
“Heisenberg,” the leading manufacturer of crystal meth in the southwest. It is 
also diffi cult to see any of the killings he commits as coerced. If anything, Walt 
may be said to be guilty, morally if not legally, of coercing others into helping 
him with his life of crime. For example, he only gets small-time drug dealer 
Jesse to agree to work with him and make crystal meth after he threatens to 
turn him in to the DEA in the pilot episode. 
 It may be possible, however, for Walt to avail himself of the justifi cation 
defense. In “To’hajiilee,” when Walt is driving out to the Indian reservation to 
stop Jesse from burning his buried money, he shouts at Jesse on the cell phone: 
“Open your eyes. Can’t you see that I needed you on my side to kill Gus? I ran 
over those gang-bangers, I killed Emilio, and Krazy-8. Why? I did all of those 
things to try to save your life as much as mine. Only you’re too stupid to know 
it.” This could be interpreted as Walt claiming that was acting in self-defense, 
and/or in defense of Jesse, and hence, that his behavior was justifi ed. 
 In the pilot episode, Walt kills drug-dealer Emilio Koyama, and gravely 
injures another drug dealer, Domingo Gallardo “Krazy-8” Molina. The two 
drug dealers had Walt and Jesse at gunpoint, and were about to kill them, 
but Walt told them that he would show them how to make crystal meth in 
his makeshift Winnebago lab, in return for their lives being spared. Instead, 
he adds phosphorous to boiling water, producing a deadly phosphine gas and 
locks them in the vehicle with the gas. Walt does so because he does not trust 
the dealers not to kill them once they know how to make crystal meth his way. 
It is possible to see this killing and injuring as justifi ed because it is a case of 
self-defense (Walt) and defense of others (Jesse) against aggressors. It is plau-
sible to believe that the drug dealers cannot be trusted to keep their agreement 
once they know how to make crystal meth Walt’s way. 8 The same could be said 
of Walt’s attempt to poison Tuco with ricin after Tuco kidnaps Walt and Jesse 
and is holding them hostage until he can transport them to Mexico to cook 
crystal meth for him (“Grilled). Walt was acting in self-defense, and in defense 
of an innocent other. 
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 However, it is more diffi cult to justify the rest of Walt’s behavior in general, 
and his killings in particular, on the basis of the defense of self and others. His 
killing of Krazy-8 fails to be a case of legally justifi ed killing, since Krazy-8 is 
not currently a threat, tied up as he is in the basement of Jesse’s house (“…
And the Bag’s in the River”). It would be possible, by contrast, for Walt to 
turn himself in and have Krazy-8 arrested. Morally, Walt wrestles with his con-
science in deciding whether or not to “murder” Krazy-8, citing in his pro and 
con list many reasons to let him go. However, when he knows that Krazy-8 
is planning to kill him with a shard of a broken plate once he is freed, he kills 
Krazy-8. 9 If this killing—of an admittedly murderous drug-dealer, who cannot 
be trusted—cannot be morally justifi ed, then Walt’s later killings for the sake of 
protecting his crystal meth empire certainly cannot not be justifi ed. 
 Even if the killing of Krazy-8 could be morally justifi ed, it is hard to see 
how Walt’s subsequent killings are morally justifi ed, such as his killing of the 
two “gang-bangers” in Season Three’s “Half Measures.” As mentioned in the 
last section, these two drug dealers, working for Gus Fring, ordered Tomás 
Cantillo, the son of Jesse’s girlfriend, to kill Jesse’s friend Combo. After all, 
Combo was dealing Walt and Jesse’s crystal meth on their turf. After Jesse 
convinced Gus to stop using kids to do his dirty work, Gus’s dealers kill Tomás 
in order to cover their tracks. Enraged, Jesse gets a gun and confronts them—
even though they are armed, experienced killers. Before they have a chance to 
kill Jesse, Walt runs them over in his Pontiac Aztek, killing one instantly. He 
then gets out and shoots the other point-blank in the head, shouting at Jesse, 
“Run!” Neither drug dealer was posing a threat to Jesse—or Walt—before 
Jesse went after them. Even if Jesse is entirely right to be outraged at their kill-
ing of Tomás, his attempt to kill them is a case of revenge-seeking rather than 
bringing them to justice. Walt does save Jesse from certain death at their hands, 
but Jesse was in peril only because of his own actions. For that reason, this 
fails to be a case of defending an innocent person. Walt’s own life was never in 
danger either, and hence this fails to be a case of self-defense. As much as Walt 
may be motivated by his concern for Jesse’s life rather than merely the prospect 
of losing his partner, and as much as the two drug dealers are beyond doubt 
ruthless murderers, Walt’s killing of them in order to protect Jesse fails to be a 
case of justifi ed killing, either legally or morally. 10 
 It’s also worth noting that Walt did not himself kill Gus Fring. Walt pro-
vided Gus’s mortal enemy, wheelchair-bound Hector “Tio” Salamanca, an 
opportunity and means to kill Gus. Years before, Salamanca had murdered 
Gus’s original business partner and presumed lover, Max Arciniega, as seen in 
a fl ashback in “Hermanos.” Walt provides Salamanca with a powerful bomb 
that allowed him to kill Gus, Gus’s assistant, Tyrus Kitt, as well as himself, in 
Season Four’s “Face Off.” Nevertheless, it was Walt’s idea to convince Hector 
to kill Gus, and Walt only enlists Hector’s help after he fails to kill Gus himself 
with the bomb. While it is true that Walt believes Gus wishes to kill him sooner 
or later and to have Jesse take over the lab, nevertheless, Gus is not currently a 
threat to Walt. Walt has the opportunity to turn himself in to the DEA with the 
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rest of his family, inform on Gus, and escape. He chooses not to do so, instead 
opting to kill Gus with Hector’s help. Killing Gus is therefore not a case of self-
defense. It is also not a case of justifi ed killing, either legally or morally. While 
it is true that “none of the dead were innocent. Salamanca, Gus, and Tyrus are 
all killers, wrapped up in the drug trade,” 11 none of them was currently threat-
ening Walt’s life, which establishes the relevant meaning of “innocent” when 
considering whether killing them was justifi ed. 
 Walt’s many other killings—for example, when he lets Jane Margolis, Jesse’s 
girlfriend, choke to death on her own vomit (“Phoenix”), or when he shoots 
Gus’s former hitman, Mike Ehrmantraut (“Say My Name”), or when, with an 
M60 mounted in the truck of his car, he mows down the White Supremacist 
gang led by Jack Welker who are holding Jesse prisoner (“Felina”)— cannot be 
classifi ed as cases of defense of self or others either, and hence are not justifi ed 
killings, either legally or morally. Much as the killing of that gang of murderers 
might be thought to be a fi tting end to their lives and a service to the world, 
Walt could have freed Jesse and turned them in to the police without killing 
any of them. 
 Neither of the two possible defenses—justifi cation or excuse—can, there-
fore, absolve Walt of his moral blame. If he wishes to escape moral blame, his 
remaining options are to revise the account of what occurred, so that he is 
blameless, or to admit wrongdoing and attempt to make up for it. 
 REWRITING THE PAST 
 Revisionism consists in recovering one’s lost moral ground by denying that 
anything wrong was done. Since one has not wronged anyone, no moral 
ground has been lost, and there is no moral ground to recover. Walt’s efforts 
to recast his actions in a more honorable light are many and varied, but his last 
phone call to his son, Walt Jr. (“Granite State”), represents a particularly poi-
gnant attempt: “Son, the things that they’re saying about me… I did wrong… 
I made some terrible mistakes… but the reasons were always… things happen 
that I never intended… I never intended…,” he pleads. 
 Walt offers two different denials that he intended for any of the bad things 
in his career of crime to happen. Since he did not intend for any of the bad 
things to happen, he cannot be held guilty of moral wrongdoing. But he also 
seems to tell Walt Jr. that he had anything except the best reasons for acting in 
the way that he did, even if he did intend for some or or all of the bad things 
to happen. Do any of these exculpate him? 
 Walt could mean, fi rst, that he never imagined that any of the bad things that 
happened would, in fact, happen, such as the killing of Hank Schrader by Jack 
Welker, in “To’hajiilee. ” Such things, he could be saying, were unforeseen by 
him when he embarked on his journey of manufacturing methamphetamine. If 
that is what he is claiming, then he is attempting to escape blame by appealing 
to the idea that he cannot be held responsible for bad things that happen as a 
result of what he did just in case he never imagined that they would happen. 
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He would be embracing the legal and moral standard of requiring a  mens rea , 
and arguing that in order for him to be held liable for such bad things, he must 
have had a “guilty mind”—something that he denies having. 
 In embracing the standard of requiring a  mens rea , Walt would be rejecting 
the standard of strict liability , or “faultless” liability, a standard used extremely 
rarely in the criminal law, and even more rarely (if ever) in morality, in which 
you are held criminally liable for what happens as a result of what you do (or do 
not do), even though you lacked any criminal intent, or knowledge of breaking 
the law, and were not reckless, or even negligent, in your behavior. An example 
would be getting a minor intoxicated by serving them alcohol, even if you had 
taken reasonable steps to ensure that they were of legal age. 12 
 The simple problem with Walt’s attempt to escape blame by denying he 
had a  mens rea— intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence—to be held 
culpable, is that it is simply false that he never imagined any of these bad things 
could happen. He was fully aware of the risks of people being harmed as a result 
of what he was doing. As noted above, Walt killed a number of people himself; 
he also ordered the killing of ten former associates of Mike’s in their jail cells. 
While he could attempt to argue that these killings were not, in fact, wrongful 
actions, because the victims were murderers, this would be a very different kind 
of defense (it would be an attempt to  justify these killings, as discussed earlier). 
It would also fail to absolve him from blame for other bad things that he did, 
such as letting Jane die or ordering Jesse to kill Gale. Neither Jane nor Gale is 
a murderer. As other commentators have said, “But Walt’s ordering Jesse to 
kill Gale under the threat of Walt’s own demise, due to Walt’s own actions, 
makes Walt complicit, and morally guilty for Gale’s death perhaps as much as 
if he had himself pulled the trigger.” 13 And these acts of violence do not even 
take into account the enormous amount of harm that he knowingly caused by 
manufacturing and selling the highly addictive and destructive crystal meth to 
people all over the country. 
 Walt did indeed possess the requisite  mens rea , therefore, to be held culpable 
for these and many other bad things that happened. Even if it were true that 
there were some bad things that Walt never could have imagined—such as the 
deaths of the 167 people aboard fl ights Wayfarer 515 and JM 21—it is not 
clear that Walt can be absolved of blame for these, at least morally, on the basis 
that to hold him responsible would be to hold him to the standard of strict 
liability. It was Walt who let Jane choke to death on her own vomit, and it was 
her death that sent her father into a depression, which, it’s not unreasonable 
for us to assume, led to the error and the deaths of the passengers, as well as 
his subsequent suicide. If this is what happened, then Walt may be held morally 
responsible for the deaths of those passengers, even if he cannot be held legally 
responsible, because he did something morally wrong in letting her die, and 
his moral wrongdoing ultimately led to their deaths. 14 The same can be said 
about Hank’s death, and that of his partner Steve Gomez, at the hands of Jack 
Welker and his gang. Hank would never have met up with Jack Welker and his 
gang in the To’hajiilee Reservation if he had not been chasing Walt to bring 
RECOVERING LOST MORAL GROUND: CAN WALT MAKE AMENDS? 149
him into custody for manufacturing and selling crystal meth. Walt does bear 
the moral responsibility for their deaths, because his decision to make crystal 
meth, and especially, to continue to make it after so many people were harmed, 
was morally wrong. As another commentator has said, “For the fi rst time, the 
reality of what his descent into Heisenberg truly means hits Walt. He collapses, 
knowing that his deeds fi nally led to the ultimate sin. A family member is dead 
because of him.” 15 
 Embracing the standard of requiring a  mens rea , therefore, will not absolve 
Walt of moral blame. 
 COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
 In saying to Walt, Jr., that “things happen that I never intended… I never 
intended…,” Walt could mean something weaker than simply that he lacked 
the requisite  mens rea to be blamed, morally or legally. He could mean that, 
although he believed either initially or eventually that these bad things would 
happen, nevertheless, he did not  intend that any of these bad things would 
happen. He could be saying, simply, that he never intended to harm anyone—
that he never intended for anyone to get hurt. 
 If this is what Walt is claiming, then he may be attempting to escape moral 
blame (if not legal blame) by implicitly appealing to the Doctrine of Double 
Effect (or the Principle of Double Effect), according to which an action that has 
both good and bad effects may be morally permissible. According to this doc-
trine, so long as I am intending some signifi cant good, it is sometimes morally 
permissible to do something bad as a foreseen side-effect (the double effect), 
even if it would be morally impermissible to intend that same bad thing. 16 For 
example, in fi ghting a just war, it may be morally permissible to bomb a muni-
tions factory in a nighttime bombing raid, injuring and even killing civilians 
asleep in their beds near the factory, as a side-effect of the factory bombing (so-
called collateral damage), even if it would be morally impermissible to bomb 
those same civilians for the sake of winning the war. So long as I act in a way 
that is in itself morally praiseworthy, or at least not morally wrong (blowing up 
the enemy’s munitions factory), only intending the good effect (the destruc-
tion of the enemy’s arsenal, and ultimately, the defeat of the enemy), and not 
intending the bad effect, which I nevertheless foresee (injuring and killing 
nearby civilians), then my action is blameless, and may be praiseworthy. There 
are a few caveats to this: the bad effect I produce cannot be a means to the 
good effect (injuring and killing nearby civilians is not a means of destroying 
the arsenal or defeating the enemy), and the good effect must be suffi ciently 
proportionately good that it compensates for the bad effect (the destruction 
of the enemy’s arsenal, and ultimately, the defeat of the enemy, is suffi ciently 
proportionately good that it compensates for the injuring and killing of nearby 
civilians). Such a doctrine may be said to be behind, for example, the mor-
ally permissible prescription of certain pain-reliving drugs like morphine that 
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shorten life expectancy, or the removal of a cancerous womb from a pregnant 
woman (a hysterectomy), which kills the fetus. 
 According to some interpretations of the Doctrine of Double Effect, self- 
defense (and likewise the defense of innocent others) may be justifi ed in this 
way: I perform some morally neutral, or morally praiseworthy, action, with the 
intent to defend myself (a good effect), and I merely foresee harming another 
person (bad effect). 17 If this were correct, then it could be argued that, for 
example, when Walt poisons Emilio Koyama and Krazy-8, his would-be killers, 
he does something that is morally neutral (mixing compounds and producing 
a gas) for a good effect (saving his life), and merely foresees their deaths as a 
result. 
 But it is highly doubtful that self-defense can ever be justifi ed by appealing 
to the Doctrine of Double Effect. In self-defense, I do, in fact, intend to harm 
the other person who is about to harm me: this is the means to saving my life. 18 
Self-defense is justifi ed because you are justifi ed in intending to harm someone 
who intends to harm you. That other person is a current threat, and not an 
innocent person. But even if Walt’s acts of self-defense can somehow be justi-
fi ed by appealing to this doctrine, there are many other things that Walt does 
that cannot be justifi ed by appealing to the doctrine. An example is when Walt 
(presumably) poisons Brock Cantillo—the son of Andrea, Jesse’s girlfriend—
with enough Lily of the Valley to make him ill, but not enough to kill him, 
and blames it on Gus Fring. Walt intends to harm an innocent boy (a morally 
wrong act), as a means to save his own life (a good effect). But intentionally 
committing a morally wrong act, even for a good end, is completely prohib-
ited by the Doctrine of Double Effect. Walt cannot avoid blame for poisoning 
Brock Cantillo by appealing to this doctrine. The same can be said about Walt’s 
ordering Jesse to kill Gale. Even if Walt believed that Gus was going to replace 
him with Gale and kill him, Gale himself was innocent. Walt intended to harm 
an innocent person (a morally wrong act), as a means of saving his own life 
(a good effect), something completely prohibited by the Doctrine of Double 
Effect. None of this can be considered collateral damage. 
 This is even more true with respect to Walt’s making and selling of crystal 
meth. Walt produces very large quantities of an illegal, highly addictive sub-
stance for which there is a huge commercial demand. He does so, as he says, 
to provide for his family, and to cover his expenses for his cancer treatment. 
But the good effects of making large profi ts don’t remotely compensate for 
the bad effects of the distribution and sale of crystal meth over a vast territory 
by criminal gangs. Moreover, those good effects could have been achieved 
by other means, had Walt been prepared to swallow his pride and accept the 
money offered by his fabulously rich former partner, Elliott Schwartz, and 
Walt’s former girlfriend (now Elliott’s wife) Gretchen Schwartz. 
 Appealing to the Doctrine of Double Effect, therefore, will not allow Walt 
to escape moral blame. 
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 FOR GOOD REASONS 
 There is a third way of understanding what Walt is saying to Walt, Jr. when he 
says, “I never intended…” He might be restating his previous claim that “I did 
wrong… I made some terrible mistakes… but the reasons were always…” If 
this last sentence is fi nished with “good,” then Walt would be admitting that 
he acted in morally wrong ways, but for good reasons—he had good inten-
tions. Here it is important to note that the word “intention” is ambiguous. 
It can mean both  why Walt does what he does—the end or goal for which he 
acts—as well as  what Walt does. The fi rst meaning of intention (as in claiming 
that someone acted with good intentions) is equivalent to the  reason or  motive 
for doing something; the second meaning (as in claiming that it was someone’s 
intention to do this rather than that) is equivalent to the (intentional)  action 
itself. 19 It is the fi rst meaning that is relevant here. 20 Understood in this way, 
Walt is attempting to reduce or eliminate his blameworthiness for what he has 
done by saying that his reasons or motives for acting were always good. As he 
says in Season Three’s “I.F.T.”: “I’ve done a terrible thing, but I’ve done it for 
a good reason. I did it for us.” 
 This is by far the weakest way for Walt to attempt to escape moral blame. 
To begin with, it would not absolve him from any blame in the eyes of the 
law. Granted that a person knows what he is doing (that is, has the requisite 
 mens rea ), and granted that he or she is not mentally ill or under duress, the 
reason or motive behind someone’s criminal behavior is completely irrelevant: 
“Hardly any part of penal law is more defi nitely settled than that motive is 
irrelevant.” 21 If a person intentionally kills another who is not a current threat 
to him—that is, if he commits murder—then it is irrelevant, as far as the law 
is concerned, if he murdered the person for revenge, for money, as a dare, to 
impress a girlfriend, for fun, to save himself, or to save other people. 22 For Walt 
to argue that, although he intentionally did things that were wrong, he did 
them for good reasons, is simply for him to argue that he is not a bad person 
despite the bad things that he has done. 
 Right up until the day he dies, Walt repeatedly tells his wife Skyler that the 
reason for all his actions—the reason why he manufactured crystal meth, pro-
tected and sold his product, and ultimately killed and harmed various people 
who got in the way—was to make enough money to take care of his family 
since he was going to die from cancer. This is what Walt means when he says 
to Walt, Jr., “but the reasons were always [good].” Indeed, when Walt begins 
to have scruples about his breaking bad and its fallout, he is talked back into 
staying the course by Gus, on this very basis, in Season Three’s “Más”:
      Gus : Why did you make these decisions? 
      Walt : For the good of my family. 
      Gus : Then they weren’t bad decisions. 
      Gus : What does a man do, Walter? A man provides for his family. 
      Walt : This costs me my family. 
152 J.E. MAHON AND J. MAHON
      Gus : When you have children, you always have family. They will always be your 
priority, your responsibility. And a man… a man provides. And he does it even 
when he’s not appreciated, or respected, or even loved. He simply bears up and 
he does it, because he’s a man. 
 The problem with this attempt to avoid blame, however, is that on the day 
that he dies, Walt fi nally admits that taking care of his family was not his reason. 
As he says in his fi nal exchange with Skyler, he did it for himself:
      Walt : You have to understand… 
      Skyler : If I have to hear, one more time, that you did this for the family–. 
      Walt : I did it for me. 
      Skyler : [Looking surprised]. 
      Walt : I liked it. I was good at it. And… I was… really… I was alive. 
 Although it may be possible to reduce or eliminate Walt’s moral blame-
worthiness for what he did by establishing that he did it all selfl essly, in order 
to take care of his family, it is hardly possible to reduce or eliminate his moral 
blameworthiness by claiming that he did it all because it made him feel alive. 
 Given that none of the three possible revisionist avenues for Walt will work, 
he cannot exonerate himself by availing of this approach to moral wrongdoing. 
Walt’s repeated attempts to rewrite (and stage-manage the rewriting) the script 
of what has happened cuts no ice. There is lost moral ground to recover, a great 
deal of it. It follows that Walt has no option, in seeking redemption, other than 
attempting to make amends for his wrongful behavior. 
 Before considering this fi nal option, however, it is worthwhile to address the 
question raised by Walt’s fi nal admission that his motivation was self-interest. 
Was he lying to Skyler, and Walt Jr., and Jesse, all along? Or was he deceiving 
himself? 23 
 IN DENIAL 
 The best explanation of why Walt never previously admitted his true reason for 
pursuing a career as a drug kingpin is that he could not even admit it to him-
self. Quite simply, he was in denial about his own motivation. Walt’s capacity 
for self-deception is almost as impressive as his capacity for deceiving others. 
Throughout his short-lived criminal career, he refused to morally evaluate his 
actions in a negative way or to acknowledge his true motivation, despite accu-
mulating plenty of evidence to the contrary. 
 In the pilot episode, Walt frames his denial unequivocally. He declares in his 
speech to his family for the video-recorder: “No matter how it may look, I had 
only you in my heart.” Accused by his wife of being a drug dealer in “No Más,” 
he replies “I’m a manufacturer, not a dealer….” “I am not a criminal, that is 
not me,” he tells Gus Fring in the same episode. “I can’t be the bad guy,” he 
repeats in the subsequent episode, “Caballo Sin Nombre.” He acknowledges 
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having made “a series of very bad decisions” (“Más”). “I never saw this com-
ing,” he blurts out in the episode “One Minute.” “Sometimes compromises 
have to be made, for the best reasons,” we are told in “Half Measures.” In 
Season Four’s “Box Cutter,” he asserts “I didn’t want any of this to happen,” 
and in “Bullet Points,” he reminds his wife that “I was and am providing for 
my family.” “I alone should suffer the consequences of those choices,” he 
maintains in the episode “End Times.” “What we do we do for good reasons; 
there’s nothing to worry about,” he advises Jesse in Season Five’s “Live Free 
or Die.” “Now that we’re in control, no one else gets hurt,” he continues. 
“I’m sorry about Brock,” he says to Jesse in “To’hajiilee,” “but he’s alive, isn’t 
he?” As he might have said, Walt did make mistakes, but he never did anything 
wrong. 
 Walt is, then, in denial, or as Jean-Paul Sartre would say, he is guilty of bad 
faith. 24 It beggars belief that someone who arguably understands the chemis-
try and manufacture of methamphetamine better than anyone else alive could 
have no understanding of its impact on the bodies and minds of those who 
consume it. Walt is not ignorant of the ravages of drug addiction. When he 
goes searching for Jesse, following the death of Jane, he locates him in a fetid, 
squalid drug den strewn with lacerated, semi-comatose bodies. He even refers 
to the downstairs of Jesse’s house, following a drug party, as “Skid Row.” He 
is also not oblivious to the  modus operandi of the drug cartels and the criminal 
underworld. Nor can Walt claim to be ignorant of the effects that his criminal 
career has on his family and associates, not to mention the people he kills and 
orders to be killed. Nevertheless, Walt somehow manages—or chooses—to 
ignore all of this. Although Sartre allows that to practice bad faith is to “to lie 
to oneself,” he insists that “we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in gen-
eral.” 25 In lying to others, I intend to deceive them, that is, to get them to hold 
as true what I know or believe to be false. But in lying to myself, the person 
who deceives and the person who is deceived are one and the same; this means, 
Sartre says, “that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is 
hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived.” 26 Bad faith or lying to 
oneself is not a state. It is not something that befalls you. On the contrary, 
“consciousness affects itself with bad faith. There must be an original intention 
and a project of bad faith.” 27 Sartre concludes that it is a project rather than a 
condition or a state because the self-deceiver “must know the truth very exactly 
in order to conceal it more carefully.” 28 
 What is interesting about Walt’s particular form of self-deception is that it 
takes the form of professionalism about his illegal drug manufacturing. This 
assumption of professionalism clouds his judgment from the very outset and 
remains embedded in his psyche. It is captured in the refrain that what he does 
is “just chemistry.” Jesse knows “the business,” while Walt knows “the chem-
istry.” Walt is in charge of the cooking, because the chemistry is his realm. He 
even refuses to accept the accolade of its being art. After his fi rst cook in the 
pilot episode, Jesse exclaims “You’re a goddamn artist. This is art, Mr. White!” 
Walt replies, “Actually, it’s just basic chemistry, but thank you, Jesse, I’m glad 
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its acceptable.” (Indeed, drug- dealer Emilio, whom he later strangles to death, 
also calls Walt an artist when he meets him). The chemistry, however, that 
Walt practices is state-of-the-art: “We will produce a chemically pure and stable 
product that performs as advertised.” Above all, Walt insists, “the chemistry 
must be respected!” But Walt does more than rigidly respect the chemistry. He 
also produces and arranges for the distribution and sale of a substance which, 
when “burned,” will turn so many users into zombies. He kills people to main-
tain his growing empire, despite having made more money than his family 
could possibly need. He has been seduced by the charms of professionalism, 
and this, in part, is what enables him to endure. 
 Walt’s self-deception is also facilitated by Gale, who works as his assistant 
in the lab. Gale supplies Walt with, as he calls it, a “libertarian” justifi cation 
for his breaking bad. Not everything that constitutes crime deserves to be 
criminalized, he asserts in Season Three’s “Sunset”: “There’s crime, and then 
there’s crime, I suppose.” As Gale sees it, they supply goods for a market, and 
if they didn’t supply them, someone else would. Moreover, the product they 
supply contains no toxins or adulterants. Their customers are getting exactly 
what they paid for. These same customers are consenting adults, deciding for 
themselves what to do with their lives, and “consenting adults want what they 
want.” So, as producers and suppliers, Walt, Gale, and Gus are expanding the 
realm of freedom, the range of choices available to adult individuals. They 
are also fulfi lling their contractual obligations. After that, what befalls drugs 
users is their own fate. They bring it on themselves. As free agents, they could 
always turn their backs and walk away. But Gale conveniently ignores the fact 
that their product is highly addictive, thus severely limiting, and perhaps even 
erasing, the libertarian freedom he speaks of. He also ignores the fact that the 
distribution and sale of that same product is illegal, and that the state does not 
condone these kinds of consensual activities. 
 While Walt’s self-deception can be explained, it cannot be defended. The con-
sequences of drug addiction are foreseeable and well documented. As a gifted 
chemist, Walt is in a prime position to know what these consequences would be 
for his customers. His involvement in the drug trade, from his encounters with 
Emilio and Krazy-8, not to mention Tuco, to Gus, and his dealers, exposed 
him to the ruthless, homicidal behavior commonplace throughout the criminal 
underworld. Even if he could not have known in advance who would be killed, 
or when, or where, or how, he could not have been blind to the fact that these 
things happen, and he knew from the start just how nasty they could be. 
 REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE 
 The French existentialist author Albert Camus favored life imprisonment 
with hard labor over capital punishment for even the very worst murderers. 
He believed that imposing the death penalty on a person deprived her of the 
opportunity of making amends, and no one should be denied the opportunity 
of making amends. In the closing stages of his essay on the death penalty, 
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“Refl ections on the Guillotine,” Camus is concerned with the fate of those he 
calls “major criminals whom all juries would condemn at any time and in any 
place whatever. Their crimes are not open to doubt, and the evidence brought 
by the accusation is confi rmed by the confessions of the defense.” 29 He gives the 
example of a young man who, annoyed by a remark made by his father about 
his coming home late, killed both his parents in cold blood with an axe, then 
“undressed, hid his bloodstained trousers in the closet, went to make a call on 
the family of his fi ancée, without showing any signs, then returned home and 
notifi ed the police that he had just found his parents murdered.” 30 While his 
“odd indifference” was abnormal, his reasoning power remained untouched, 
and the medical experts asserted he was responsible for his actions, as opposed 
to concluding he was suffering from a mental illness or acting under duress. 
 Such “monsters,” notes Camus, evoke the most extreme response from 
society’s guardians: “Apparently the nature or the magnitude of their crimes 
allows no room for imagining that they can ever repent or reform. They must 
merely be kept from doing it again, and there is no other solution but to elimi-
nate them.” 31 Camus, for his part, begs to differ. Everyone, he holds, is capable 
of making amends, and not just those with a benefi cent disposition: “Deciding 
that a man must have the defi nitive punishment imposed on him is tantamount 
to deciding that a man has no chance of making amends.” 32 
 There are two parts to Camus’ argument here. First, there is the claim that 
everyone is capable of making amends. Second, there is the claim that everyone 
has amends to make. The latter proposition is true because “we have all done 
wrong in our lives even if that wrong, without falling within the jurisdiction 
of the law, went as far as the unknown crime.” 33 To make sure that we do not 
miss or underestimate the importance of this point, Camus adds, provocatively, 
“There are no just people  - merely hearts more or less lacking in justice.” 34 
Allowing even the worst criminal to continue living is, for Camus, essentially 
a matter of giving precedence to the principle of equality: it is giving him, or 
her, the same opportunity to make amends as is given to everyone else. So it 
comes about that “the lowest of criminals and the most upright of judges meet 
side by side, equally wretched in their solidarity. Without that right, moral life 
is utterly impossible.” 35 
 Camus has a more abstract and complex concept of making amends than 
that found in common usage. To make amends, as the phrase is commonly 
used, means to restore to another, or to others, what you have taken from 
them; alternatively, it means to compensate others for the harm you have caused 
them. But for Camus, it means adding good things to the sum of good things 
you have done, which in turn augments the universal sum of good things done, 
which in turn will help atone or compensate for all the bad things you have 
done: “Living at least allows us to discover this and to add to the sum of our 
actions a little of the good that will make up in part for the evil we have added 
to the world. Such a right to live, which allows a chance to make amends, is the 
natural right of every man, even the worst men.” 36 Whereas in common usage 
making amends means restoring to other people, or compensating them, for 
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Camus it means restoring an equilibrium between aggregates of good and evil. 
Thus, even Camus’s preferred alternative to capital punishment—life imprison-
ment with hard labor—is capable of providing a person with the opportunity 
to exercise his or her right to atone, since, even under the gruesome conditions 
of penal servitude during the postwar period, a prisoner could have behaved 
badly or well toward other prisoners and warders. In any event, Walt, by con-
trast with Camus’s prisoner, manifestly does have the resources to make some 
reparation to some of those he has harmed, as well as to the wider society. 
 MAKING AMENDS 
 Walt, who has been characterized as “a hapless passive-aggressive chemistry 
teacher” who mutates into “a hapless passive-aggressive meth cook,” 37 has also 
been characterized as a chemistry teacher who has not just broken  bad , but 
“broken  evil ”—just as evil, indeed, as Gus Fring—and as someone who has 
“taken his wife down this path too, corrupting her, involving her in a con-
spiracy, and endangering his family and friends,” 38 not to mention converting 
his partner Jesse into a murderer. Walt has a lot of moral ground to recover. 
The question is whether and how much of this moral ground can be recovered 
by making amends for past wrongdoing, in Camus’ sense. 
 It is conceded here that Walt does make some amends for his past misdeeds. 
The good things that he does in his fi nal days, as depicted in the series’ fi nal 
episode, “Felina,” add to the universal sum of good things achieved by all 
human agents. Walt himself believed he could make amends by way of direct 
compensation. He rescues Jesse from his imprisonment at the hands of Jack 
Welker and his gang, ending their crystal meth production, and in so doing 
removes the remaining threat to his family. He even hands Jesse a gun to give 
him the opportunity to kill him for all that he had put him through. He devises 
an elaborate benefaction scheme to fi nance Walt, Jr.’s college education with 
$9.72 million that he gives to Elliott and Gretchen Schwartz, so that they can 
set up an irrevocable trust fund for Walt Jr. on his eighteenth birthday. He 
also supplies Skyler with the GPS coordinates of the place where Hank and his 
partner Steve Gomez are buried, and tells her “Now you trade that for a deal 
with the Prosecutor. You’ll get yourself out of this, Skyler.” 
 It is true that, in order to do all of this, he has to shoot almost the entire 
gang—leaving Jesse to strangle his captor and tormentor, Todd—as well as poi-
son Lydia, the mastermind behind the global distribution network for the blue 
crystal meth. He does not turn them into the authorities. He does not afford 
any of these murderers the opportunity for moral redemption. Nevertheless, 
even if these killings cannot be morally justifi ed, the motivation behind wiping 
out a white supremacist gang, and shutting down global distribution network 
for the blue crystal meth, as well as that behind saving Jesse and protecting his 
family is more admirable than simply eliminating the competition. His killings 
could even be said to add to the sum of good in the world, even if his actions 
cannot be morally justifi ed. 
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 It has been said that “More importantly, there is no redemption for Walt in 
‘Felina.’ None of what he does in that fi nal episode excuses what he did in the 
61 prior. None of it made him a hero in the end. He does not make up for his 
lies and crimes. He does not wash away poisoning children and destroying fam-
ilies and being a vile manipulator of people he claimed to care about.” 39 While 
it is true that Walt’s fi nal actions do not excuse his previous moral wrongdoing, 
and do not elide his previous sins, and while it is true that these fi nal actions 
do not “make up” for all his crimes and mistreatment of people, nevertheless, 
it is possible to believe that Walt does make some amends in his fi nal days, 
and that in general he is right to think that it is possible for moral wrongdoers 
to recover lost moral ground. To some extent, Walt does recover lost moral 
ground toward the end of  Breaking Bad . How much moral ground he has 
recovered is a probably a moot point. Suffi ce it to say that in the concluding 
scenes Walt appears a sad, depleted, ashen, forlorn, tragic fi gure, but he is no 
“monster.” Some moral reputation has been restored. 
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